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Extended Terms for Dangerous Offenders Under
the Proposed Federal Criminal Code (S. 1):
The Emerging Legislative History
JAMES H. KLEIN*
In late 1975 Congress moved toward enacting the first comprehen-
sive federal criminal code in the history of the United States. The
Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures reported
on the Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975 (S. 1 or the Code).' S. 1
is the product of over four years of work by the Subcommittee,
building on earlier efforts by the National Commission on Reform
of Federal Criminal Laws (Brown Commission) and the American
Law Institute.' As of December, 1976, S. 1 awaited action by the
Senate Judiciary Committee.
Among its voluminous provisions3 the Code creates a category of
felons known as "dangerous special offenders" (DSO). DSOs may
be imprisoned for terms much longer than conventional offenders
committing similar crimes. This article examines some procedural
and substantive prerequisites for DSO sentencing under S. 1, partic-
ularly focusing on the emerging legislative history of these provi-
sions.
Under the Code a DSO is an offender within one of three catego-
ries described in section 2302: recidivist, professional criminal, or
organized crime conspirator.4 The authorized extended term of im-
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Loyola University of Chicago. B.A., Midwestern
University, 1965; Ph.D., Princeton University, 1972; J.D., Temple University School of Law,
1976.
1. S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1975). All references to S. 1 are to this version
of the bill unless otherwise noted. The draft report submitted by the Subcommittee is cited
as STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT TO ACCOMPANY S. 1, 94th Cong., Ist
Sess. (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as REPORT]. See 121 CONG. REC. S18,318 (daily
ed. Oct. 21, 1975).
2. A short history of S. 1 may be found at Crystal, The Proposed Federal Criminal Justice
Reform Act of 1975: A Civil Liberties Critique, 6 SEroN HALL L. REv. 591 (1975). For a
comparison of earlier versions of S. 1 see Special Committee on the Proposed New Federal
Criminal Code, The Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Three Versions of a Proposed
New Federal Criminal Code, July, 1974, reprinted in Hearings on Reform of the Federal
Criminal Laws Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. XI, at 7692 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
3. S. 1 is presently 799 pages in length.
4. These labels are used by the Subcommittee in describing the categories covered by the
CODE REPORT, supra note 1, at 922. Section 2302 sets out the DSO categories in much greater
detail:
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prisonment for a felony committed by a DSO is "not more than
twice the term authorized for the felony" by the conventional sent-
encing provision, "or twenty-five years, whichever is less."5 Status
as a DSO is not in itself sufficient grounds for sentencing as a DSO.
The district court also must find "that, considering the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of
the defendant, such an extended term is warranted to protect the
public from further crimes of the defendant."" Both issues-whether
defendant is a DSO and whether he is a future threat to public
safety as to warrant sentencing as a DSO-must be determined
through special procedures set forth in that part of S. 11 which
amends the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Increased sentences for dangerous offenders would not be a wholly
novel addition to federal criminal law. The first statutes applying
the concept were enacted in 1970.1 However, the Code's language
A defendant is a dangerous special offender if:
(1) he has previously been convicted of two or more felonies committed on differ-
ent occasions; one or more of such felonies resulted in his being in imprisonment
prior to the commission of the current offense; one or more of such felonies was
committed within, or resulted in his being in imprisonment or on probation or
parole within, ten years of the commission of the current offense; and no such felony
was charged to be a basis for increasing the grading of the current offense under
section 1811 (Trafficking in an Opiate), 1812 (Trafficking in Drugs), 1813 (Possess-
ing Drugs), 1814 (Violating a Drug Regulation), or 1823 (Using a Weapon in the
Course of a Crime);
(2) he committed the current felony as part of a pattern of criminal conduct from
which he derived a substantial portion of his income, or in which he manifested
special skill or expertise-such as unusual knowledge, judgment, ability, or manual
dexterity-in facilitating the initiation, organizing, planning, financing, direction,
management, supervision, execution, or concealment of criminal conduct, the en-
listment of accomplices in such conduct, the avoidance of detection or apprehension
of such conduct, or the disposition of the fruits or proceeds of such conduct; or
(3) the current felony constitutes, or was committed in furtherance of, a conspir-
acy with three or more other persons to engage in a pattern of criminal conduct;
the current felony was not charged to be an offense, or an attempt of conspiracy to
commit an offense, under section 1801 (Operating a Racketeering Syndicate) or
1802 (Racketeering) or 1803 (Washing Racketeering Proceeds); and he initiated,
organized, planned, financed, directed, managed, or supervised, all or part of such
conspiracy or conduct, or agreed to do so, or gave or received a bribe or used force
in the course of such conduct. For purposes of paragraphs (2) and (3), criminal
conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar
purposes, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events.
5. S. 1 § 2301(c).
6. Id. § 2302(b).
7. Proposed rule 32.1, S. 1, supra note 1, at 380. See note 11 infra.
8. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1970) (the provisions concern-
ing increased sentences for dangerous special offenders comprise Title X, § 1001(a) of the
Act); Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 849 (1970)
(the provisions concerning increased sentences for dangerous special drug offenders comprise
19771 Extended Terms for DSOs
differs substantially from current law in several respects. The ques-
tion then arises, in what ways does S. 1 alter the procedural and
substantive basis of extended sentencing?
There are similarities between the elements of DSO status in the
Code and the analogous concept of "special offender" used in 18
U.S.C. § 3575 and 21 U.S.C. § 849. While these statutes also aim
at recidivists, professional criminals, and organized crime conspira-
tors,' such similarities should not foreclose inquiry into significant
differences that exist in the way these concepts are operational-
ized. 10 However, this article examines other aspects of the Code
which have the apparent intent of producing major alterations in
the procedural and substantive bases of the requirement that a
defendant be so dangerous as to warrant extended sentencing. Spe-
cifically, to what extent does the Code require the Government to
give notice of its intent to prove defendant so threatening as to
warrant DSO sentencing; what if any tests does the Code require a
district court to use in deciding whether defendant's menacing char-
Title HI, § 409 of the Act).
9. A defendant is a special offender for purposes of this section if-
(1) the defendant has previously been convicted in courts of the United States, a
State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a territory or
possession of the United States, any political subdivision, or any department,
agency or instrumentality thereof for two or more offenses committed on occasions
different from one another and from such felony and punishable in such courts by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year, for one or more of such convictions
the defendant has been imprisoned prior to the commission of such felony, and less
than five years have elapsed between the commission of such felony and either the
defendant's release, on parole or otherwise, from imprisonment for one such convic-
tion or his commission of the last such previous offense or another offense punish-
able by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under applicable laws of the
United States, a State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, a territory or possession of the United States, any political subdivision, or any
department, agency or instrumentality thereof; or
(2) the defendant committed such felony as part of a pattern of conduct which
was criminal under applicable laws of any jurisdiction, which constituted a sub-
stantial source of his income, and in which he manifested special skill or expertise;
or
(3) such felony was, or the defendant committed such felony in furtherance of, a
conspiracy with three or more other persons to engage in a pattern of conduct
criminal under applicable laws of any jurisdiction, and the defendant did, or agreed
that he would, initiate, organize, plan, finance, direct, manage, or supervise all or
part of such conspiracy or conduct, or give or receive a bribe or use force as all or
part of such conduct.
18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1970). The language of 21 U.S.C. § 849(e) (1970) defining a "special drug
offender" is practically identical.
10. For example, S. l's definition of a recidivist would encompass many more offenders
with prior convictions than current law. S. 1 makes prior convictions over a 10 year period
preceding the current offense relevant to the DSO finding, whereas current law is limited to
the preceding 5 year period. See notes 4 and 9 supra.
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acteristics justify DSO sentencing; and in what sense does S. 1 alter
current law regarding these issues.
THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE BY THE GOVERNMENT
Proposed rule 32.1 requires a special post-conviction hearing to
determine whether an extended term should be imposed, if the pros-
ecutor files a pre-trial notice requesting the hearing." The notice
must allege "that the defendant is a dangerous special offender who,
upon conviction . . . , is subject to the imposition of an extended
term of imprisonment" under Code sections 2301(c) and 2302(b).
Moreover, it must set forth "with particularity the reasons for [the
prosecutor's] belief that the defendant is a dangerous special of-
fender." While invoking the extended term process is within the
discretion of the prosecutor," the apparent intent of the Senate
11. Rule 32.1-Sentence of a Dangerous Special Offender
(a) Pretrial Notice-If the attorney for the government has reason to believe that
a defendant charged with a felony is a dangerous special offender as defined in 18
U.S.C. 2302(b), he may sign and file with the court, a reasonable time before trial
or before acceptance by the court of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, a notice:
(1) alleging that the defendant is a dangerous special offender who, upon
conviction for such felony, is subject to the imposition of an extended term
of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. 2301(c) and 2302(b); and
(2) setting forth with particularity the reasons for his belief that the defen-
dant is a dangerous special offender.
In no case shall the fact that the defendant is alleged to be such an offender be
disclosed to the jury. If the court finds that the filing of the notice as a public record
may prejudice fair consideration of a pending criminal matter, the notice shall be
sealed by the court and shall not be filed as a public record, produced under
subpoena, or otherwise made public during the pendency of the criminal matter,
except on order of the court, but shall be subject to inspection by the defendant
who is alleged to be a dangerous special offender or by his counsel.
(b) Hearing-After a defendant alleged to be a dangerous special offender is
found guilty or enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and before sentence is
imposed, the court shall fix a time for, and shall hold, a hearing to determine
whether the defendant should be sentenced as a dangerous special offender. The
hearing shall be held before the court sitting without a jury, and the defendant and
the government shall be entitled to assistance of counsel, compulsory process, and
cross examination of such witnesses as appear at the hearing. If it appears by a
preponderance of the information, including information submitted during the
trial, during the sentencing hearing, and in so much of the presentence report as
the court relies on, that the defendant is a dangerous special offender and that a
sentence as a dangerous special offender is warranted to protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant, the court shall sentence the defendant in accord-
ance with the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 2301(c) and 2302(b). The court shall place in
the record its findings, including an identification of the information relied upon
in making its findings.
12. Rule 32.1 states that the prosecutor may file notice thereby triggering a post-
conviction hearing. At least one court has construed identical language concerning the notice
provisions of one of the current federal enhancement statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 3575(a) (1970), to
create prosecutorial discretion to seek enhancement but no discretion as to the filing of notice.
United States v. Edwards, 379 F. Supp. 617 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
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Subcommittee is to make the filing of pre-trial notice a necessary
condition for the hearing.' 3 Less clear is what the "particularity"
requirement demands of the content of the notice.
At first glance the Code seems to provide a partial answer to this
question. Since "dangerous special offender" refers to the offender
type described in section 2302,'1 the notice must show the basis for
the belief that the defendant falls within one of those statutory
categories. But the Code does not indicate the degree of specificity
required of factual allegations pertaining to defendant's DSO sta-
tus.
More significantly, the Code fails to state whether the notice must
also show the basis for believing that the defendant should be sent-
enced as a DSO, which belief presumably underlies the initiation
of the procedure in the first place. These issues might be overlooked
were it not for two aspects of the legislative history of S. 1. The first
is the Subcommittee's stated intent to use current extended sent-
encing procedures as a model, and the second is the construction
which federal courts have imposed upon current statutes.
Notice Under Current Law
The Subcommittee's report states that proposed rule 32.1 "makes
one significant change in existing law" and cites the omission, from
the proposed rule, of the current ban on disclosure of the notice to
the judge until after the trial.'5 No mention is made of any intent
to alter the requirements under current law pertaining to the con-
13. "The rule governs two procedures basic to dangerous special offender sentencing-the
requirement of pretrial notice and the necessity for a hearing to determine whether a defen-
dant should be sentenced as a dangerous special offender." REPORT, supra note 1, at 1125
(emphasis added). Two district courts have construed the two current enhancement statutes
upon which rule 32.1 is based in ways that support the mandatory nature of notice. United
States v. Tramunti, 377 F. Supp. 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) held that the procedures described in 21
U.S.C. § 849 must be precisely followed. United States v. Edwards, 379 F. Supp. 617 (M.D.
Fla. 1974) held that 18 U.S.C. § 3575 would accommodate no interpretation other than one
which required filing of notice before trial or the rendering of a guilty plea. For an argument
that notice of the possibility of enhanced sentencing is a due process requirement, see Note,
The Constitutionality of Statutes Permitting Increased Sentences for Habitual or Dangerous
Criminals, 89 H~av. L. REv. 356, 383 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Increased Sentences].
14. See note 4 supra.
15. "In no case shall the fact that the defendant is alleged to be a dangerous special
offender be an issue upon the trial of such felony, be disclosed to the jury, or be disclosed
before any plea of guilty or nolo contendere or verdict or finding of guilty to the presiding
judge without the consent of the parties." 18 U.S.C. § 3575(a) (1970). The Report explains
that disclosure is not likely to cause judicial bias and that non-disclosure creates practical
difficulties in some districts, e.g., those where only one judge sits. REPoa'r, supra note 1, at
1125. The Report cites section 3575(a) as the basis for proposed rule 32.1. Id. Nearly identical
language appears in the special sentencing statute pertaining to dangerous drug offenders,
21 U.S.C. § 849 (1970).
19771
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 8
tent of the notice, nor does the language of rule 32.1 differ materially
from that of current statutes. 6
The meaning of current notice provisions has been the concern of
at least three district courts in recent cases. Because current en-
hancement statutes were enacted in 1970, and since these statutes
have been seldom invoked by federal prosecutors, 7 the courts were
confronted with novel questions concerning both the nature and
specificity of the notice allegations.
In United States v. Kelly'8 the defendant was found guilty of
unlawfully receiving firearms as a convicted felon, which would sub-
ject him to a maximum two year prison term. Before trial, the
Government had filed notice alleging that defendant's previous fe-
lony convictions brought him within the recidivist provision of 18
U.S.C. § 3575(e)(1), thereby making him a "special offender."' 9 The
notice also alleged that defendant was "dangerous" under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3575(f)20 without stating any support for this allegation. Granting
defendant's post-trial motion to strike the notice, the court held
that section 3575(a)'s particularity requirement demanded a state-
ment of reasons pertinent to both the elements of special offender
status and dangerousness. Moreover, the court held that the defec-
tive notice could not be amended after trial.2 ' In United States v.
16. Compare the language of rule 32.1 set out at note 11 supra, with 18 U.S.C. § 3575(a)
(1970): "[A] notice (1) specifying that the defendant is a dangerous special offender who
upon conviction for such felony is subject to the imposition of a sentence under subsection
(b) of this section, and (2) setting out with particularity the reasons why such attorney
believes the defendant to be a dangerous special offender."
17. As of this writing there are only four reported cases where the Government has sought
to invoke 18 U.S.C. § 3575 against a defendant. United States v. Duardi, 384 F. Supp. 874
(W.D. Mo. 1973) (Government's motion denied); United States v. Edwards, 379 F. Supp. 617
(M.D. Fla. 1974) (Government's motion denied); United States v. Kelly, 384 F. Supp. 1394
(W.D. Mo. 1974), aft'd, 519 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1975) (Government's motion denied); United
States v. Holt, 397 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (extended term imposed). In an unre-
ported case cited in Duardi, the Government withdrew its notice to invoke section 3575
pending Justice Department review of policy concerning cases selected for extended sentenc-
ing. United States v. Civella, No. 23562-3 (W.D. Mo., filed Nov. 15, 1971). There is only one
reported case where the Government has sought to invoke 21 U.S.C. § 849. United States v.
Tramunti, 377 F. Supp. 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Government's motion denied). The Supreme
Court has not decided a case which puts in issue either of these statutes, although members
of the Court have offered dicta pertaining to the construction of the special offender defini-
tions of section 3575. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 786-88, 796-97 (1975)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
18. 384 F. Supp. 1394 (W.D. Mo. 1974), afl'd, 519 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1975).
19. See note 9 supra.
20. "(f) A defendant is dangerous for purposes of this section if a period of confinement
longer than that provided for such felony is required for the protection of the public from
further criminal conduct by the defendant." 18 U.S.C. § 3575(f).
21. Affirmed on appeal by the Government. United States v. Kelly, 519 F.2d 251 (8th Cir.
1975).
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Tramunti2  another court placed a similar construction on the
nearly identical special drug offender sentencing provision of 21
U.S.C.- § 849.
By far the most elaborate judicial analysis of current notice re-
quirements appears in United States v. Duardi.2 3 Over the course of
four separate post-conviction opinions, District Judge John W.
Oliver rejected broadly the Government's efforts to invoke an ex-
tended term hearing for four "organized crime" defendants under
18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)(3).2 1 As in Kelly, the Government's pre-trial
notice alleged only facts pertinent to the issue of defendants' special
offender status. It failed to mention the element of dangerousness.2
5
While agreeing with Kelly that the statute generally bars post-trial
amendment of notice, Judge Oliver assumed that special circum-
stances in Duardi made "timely amendment" permissible. 26 Conse-
quently, he ordered the Government to file a statement of the evi-
dence it would introduce at the sentencing hearing to prove danger-
ousness.Y The Government argued that it should not be required to
prove facts beyond showing that defendants were special offenders,
because dangerousness could be inferred from their status as "or-
ganized crime offenders" within section 3575(e)(3). The court re-
jected the theory of inferred dangerousness, characterized the "or-
ganized crime offender" allegation as "loose talk" insufficient for
notice purposes, and again ordered a summary statement of evi-
dence.Y
The Government then filed an amended notice describing the
following evidence it would introduce: records of prior forgery and
burglary convictions and probation revocation for firearms posses-
sion; testimony that defendants attempted to kill the Government's
chief trial witness; hearsay testimony of reports by a confidential
informant that one defendant was "the most powerful member of
the criminal organization" in Kansas City; testimony, excluded at
trial, showing Duardi's status as "a current representative of an
22. 377 F. Supp. 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
23. 384 F. Supp. 856, 861, 871, 874 (W.D. Mo. 1974), appeal dismissed, 514 F.2d 545 (8th
Cir. 1975).
24. See note 9 supra.
25. 384 F. Supp. at 862.
26. Id. at 879. In an earlier proceeding Judge Oliver had ordered a pre-sentence report by
the Bureau of Prisons and had sentenced defendants pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4208(b) (1970),
upon his finding that the government's notice was insufficient. However, at that time he ruled
that the section 4208(b) sentence did not preclude the filing of an amended notice and
subsequent enhanced sentencing under section 3575. He then ruled that the Government
could move to amend. Id. at 872-73.
27. 384 F. Supp. at 861.
28. Id. at 868-70.
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organized criminal group"; hearsay statements made by him 10
years ago admitting his "long standing association with organized
crime"; 25 year old government reports, prepared by a now deceased
F.B.I. agent, showing Duardi's "organized crime connections"; and
records showing consistent under-payment of sales taxes on receipts
from a tavern owned by him.29 The court dismissed the amended
notice on the ground that the Government's proffered evidence was
legally insufficient for invoking an extended term hearing. Such
evidence would not "validly support a judicial finding that a partic-
ular defendant is, in fact, a dangerous special offender."30
If Kelly, Tramunti, and Duardi were decided correctly on the
notice issue,3 at least three generalizations can be made about cur-
rent requirements. The notice must indicate the factual basis for the
prosecutor's belief that the defendant, if convicted, may be sub-
jected to an extended term. The statement of reasons must be in
terms more concrete than a mere recital of statutory language defin-
29. Id. at 877-79.
30. Id. at 880. Judge Oliver relied on three theories to reach his conclusion of legal insuffi-
ciency. First, evidence concerning prior convictions and probation revocations would be "ir-
relevant and immaterial" to the claim that defendants were organized crime special offenders
under subsection (e)(3). Such evidence would only be relevant if defendants were alleged to
be recidivists under subsection (e)(1). But the court fails to resolve the issue that it might be
relevant to the element of dangerousness. See id. at 881 n.3. Secondly, evidence merely
showing connections with "organized crime" would be outside the scope of what Congress
intended as relevant to sentencing. Subsection (b) requires that defendant's dangerous spe-
cial offender status be shown by a "preponderance of the information," and that the "infor-
mation" relied upon by the court be entered in the record. Evidence of association with
"organized crime" was merely "loose talk" rather than "information" within the intent of
the statute, in spite of legislative history indicating that section 3575(e)(3) was aimed at
"organized crime offenders." See H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 61, 62, re-
printed in [19701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4007, 4038. Third, reliance on the evidence
sought to be introduced by the Government would violate due process on several counts.
Citing Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) and United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443
(1972), the court urged that proffered hearsay testimony about organized crime contacts
would be inadmissible at the hearing because its accuracy could not be tested by cross-
examination or otherwise. Citing Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) and In re Winship,
397 U.S. 350 (1970), the court argued that proffered evidence tending to show by a "prepon-
derance of the information" other criminal conduct which defendants had not yet been
convicted of would violate the applicable "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" test.
31. Kelly was affirmed at 519 F. 2d 251 (8th Cir. 1975). In its opinion the court of appeals
quoted favorably from Duardi. The same court dismissed a government appeal from Duardi
on the grounds that the trial court had not yet imposed final sentence and, therefore, had
not yet rendered a final decision from which appeal could be made. 514 F.2d at 545. United
States v. Holt, 397 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D. Tex., 1975) conflicts with Duardi in so far as the latter
holds section 3575 unconstitutional. Holt imposed an extended term on recidivists after
holding, inter alia, that the government's notice met the particularity requirements "by
specifying the reasons the U.S. attorney believed [defendants] to be special dangerous
offenders," Id. at 1400. Since the court failed to discuss the contents of the notice further, it
is impossible to determine whether it would have met the requirements of Kelly, Tramunti,
or Duardi.
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ing a dangerous special offender. And the allegations must run to
both dangerousness and special offender status, as those terms are
separately defined in current law. In effect, the third requirement
may impose on the Government the burden of pleading and proving
in the pretrial notice that the defendant should be given an ex-
tended term of imprisonment. This potential exists because of the
way in which 18 U.S.C. § 3575 and 21 U.S.C. § 849 define the terms
"special offender" and "dangerous."
"Special offenders" are of three types, similar to the DSO catego-
ries of S. 1-recidivists, professional criminals, and organized crime
conspirators. A special offender is dangerous, under subsection (f),
if an extended term "is required for the protection of the public from
further criminal conduct by the defendant.""2 Consequently, in giv-
ing notice of reasons for believing that a defendant is dangerous, the
prosecutor must state reasons for believing an extended term is
required for public safety. Kelly and Tramunti found the notice
defective because of the complete absence of such reasons; Duardi
focused on the legal sufficiency of the reasons provided in the
amended notice. The Kelly rationale does suggest that whatever
reasons are given must pass some test of legal sufficiency, although
perhaps one not so demanding as that imposed by Duardi. Which
test is applied determines whether, under current law, the notice
must show the Government's ability to prove defendant so danger-
ous as to require an extended term or whether the notice carries
some lesser burden. In order to understand the significance of these
tests, and whether S. 1 incorporates them, further analysis of Kelly
and Duardi is necessary.
The Kelly court perceived that the notice requirement serves
more modest purposes than those posited by Duardi. In Kelly, the
court focused on the role which the Government's notice might play
in defendant's decision to plead guilty. Notice of the possibility of
an extended term is a prerequisite to a knowing and intelligent plea.
Failure to file until after defendant pleads guilty would vitiate the
plea because it was made in ignorance of the maximum sentence
that might be imposed as a consequence. 3 The court extended this
logic to the case of post-plea amendment of notice, which would give
defendant "grounds to withdraw or set aside his plea for the reason
32. See note 9 supra.
33. In United States v. Edwards, 379 F. Supp. 617, 621 (M.D. Fla. 1974), the court
reasoned from this premise to the conclusion that a notice filed under 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1970)
after a conviction resulting from a trial was as defective as one filed after a guilty plea,
because "the statute provides no basis whatever for a distinction to be drawn between a plea
and a trial vis-a-vis the express requirement that the notice be filed prior to those events."
19771
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 8
that the plea of guilty or nolo contendere was not knowledgeably
made in the absence of the additional, derogatory information con-
tained in the amended notice."34 The argument rests on the premise
that defendant's plea relies not only upon the fact that a notice has
been filed, which triggers the possibility of an extended term, but
also relies to some extent on the contents of the notice; and the
contents must be such as will serve the purpose of facilitating intel-
ligent pleas. 5 The court gave no guidance as to either the quality of
the "reasons" set forth in the notice or the particularity of its factual
allegation required to facilitate intelligent pleas. It seems, however,
that some standard of bare legal sufficiency which serves this pur-
pose would fall well short of the burden of indicating the Govern-
ment's ability to prove dangerousness or the necessity for an ex-
tended term. A test that merely requires the notice to indicate the
reasonableness of the prosecutor's decision to initiate the extended
term procedures may satisfy the court.
Legislative History of the Notice Provisions
A simple notice incorporating only the prosecutor's judgment
34. 384 F. Supp. at 1400. The court further extended this argument to cases where a not
guilty plea had been entered on the theory that a double standard barring post-plea amend-
ment but allowing post-trial amendment would tend to penalize those exercising their right
to a jury trial contrary to due process. Compare United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
35. This is consistent with the Justice Department's view of the purpose behind the notice
requirement set forth as part of the legislative history of section 3575. Assistant Attorney
General Will Wilson in a letter to Congressman Emanuel Celler, then Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, states: "In any event, as a matter of fairness it is essential that a
defendant be notified prior to pleading that he faces the possibility of sentencing as a danger-
ous special offender, whether or not such notice is at that time required to be filed with the
court .. " H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., .2d Sess. 8998, reprinted in [1970] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4069. Reliance on the content of the notice is but an extension of
the logic of reliance on the fact of the notice. A guilty plea entered in reliance on a notice
that is facially defective or that alleges facts which plainly would not support an extended
term would seem, if post-plea curative amendments were allowed, to be no more knowledge-
able than one entered in reliance on the fact that no notice had been filed. Some minimal
assessment of the probability of an extended term may be as important for plea purposes as
knowledge of the mere possibility.
36. While this test would not go directly to the issue of intelligent guilty pleas, it may go
to the related issue of their voluntariness. The test would serve the purpose of curtailing the
abuse of prosecutorial discretion that could accompany the filing of facially or otherwise
invalid notices as a device for coercing guilty pleas from uncooperative defendants. The
coercive power of such a notice which would arise from the prosecutor's promise to withdraw
it upon the entry of a guilty plea would be diminished if grounds existed for attacking its
legal sufficiency. A suggestion that the court in Kelly was cognizant of the coercive potential
of the notice is evident. 384 F. Supp. at 1401 n.3. In at least one reported case, defendant
based an appeal from a denial of a motion to vacate sentence on the ground that he was
coerced into pleading guilty by the Government's threat to try him as a dangerous special
offender under section 3575. The appellate court vacated the sentence and plea on other
grounds. United States v. Untiedt, 479 F.2d 1265 (8th Cir. 1973).
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would not satisfy the court in Duardi where two more demanding
rationales were suggested for the notice provision of 18 U.S.C. §
3575. One rationale emerged fairly clearly from the legislative his-
tory of the provision. 7 In defending the extended sentencing proce-
dure, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on S. 30, which con-
tained language that was incorporated into section 3575, quoted
from the comment to section 7.08 of the Model Penal Code propos-
ing similar procedures: "[Flairness demands a hearing, focused on
the precise question of the existence of the grounds for such a sent-
ence with notice to the defendant of the ground proposed."" More-
over, Senator McClellan, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Crim-
inal Laws and Procedures which initially reported S. 30, states in
a lengthy analysis of the bill: "The notice provided to a defendant
accused as a dangerous special offender was changed to add the
grounds for considering him dangerous. ' 39 Finally, the House Judi-
ciary Committee Report on S. 30 emphasized the requirement in
section 3575 (a) that "the notice will be subject to inspection by the
defendant and his counsel."40 Taken together, these expressions of
legislative intent suggest that the notice must be sufficient to enable
the defendant to prepare adequately a defense for the extended term
hearing. This might be called the apprisal function of notice.',
It is evident from section 3575(b) that the hearing is an adversary
proceeding at which defendant may controvert evidence justifying
an extended term.2 Moreover, the Government is not limited to
evidence submitted during the trial or contained in the pre-sentence
report but may introduce new facts at the hearing. However, the
37. 384 F. Supp. at 865-66.
38. S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1969).
39. McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil
Liberties? 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55, 172 (1970).
40. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 60, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWs 4007, 4037.
41. This is analogous to the apprisal function of the indictment of information in the
prosecution of the substantive offense. See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 785 (1962)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); FED. R. CalM. P.
7(c). The indictment must state the elements of the offense with sufficient factual specificity
so as to apprise the defendant of the actual crime with which he is charged in order that he
may prepare an adequate defense. Note, Indictment Sufficiency, 70 COLUM L. REv. 876 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Indictment Sufficiency].
42. Within certain limitations, the defendant may examine the pre-sentence report prior
to the hearing so as to afford a reasonable opportunity for verification. The parties may be
required to give each other notice of their intent to controvert any part of the presentence
report. The parties are entitled to assistance of counsel, compulsory process, and cross-
examination of witnesses appearing at the hearing. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1970); 21 U.S.C.
§ 849(b) (1970).
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rules of admissibility do not govern the hearing." The adversary
nature of the hearing would be subverted were defendant not ap-
prised of the kinds of information the Government would submit.
A statement of the "grounds" for believing defendant to be a dan-
gerous special offender, sufficient to aid the preparation of an ade-
quate defense, at a minimum must be more specific than that re-
quired if the only function of notice were to facilitate intelligent
guilty pleas. However, the review presented earlier of the amended
notice in Duardi suggests that it was clearly sufficient for defense
preparation." Yet, the court held it insufficient. Apparently, in
spite of the court's recognition of the apprisal rationale in the stat-
ute's legislative history, a stricter test of legal sufficiency was ap-
plied. The nature of that test emerges from the court's citation of a
single sentence from the Senate Report: "The proceeding may not
be initiated unless there is 'reason to believe' the defendant is a
dangerous special offender. See Minnesota v. Probate Court, 309
U.S. 270, 60 S. Ct. 523, 84 L. Ed. 744 (1940)."1' This statement may
suggest that the Senate drafters of section 3575(a) did not intend
that the initiation of the extended term procedure be left wholly
within the discretion of the prosecutor, subject only to the weak
limitation implicit in the test for abuse of discretion. Rather the
drafters may have intended that initiation depend upon a reasona-
ble and demonstrable belief that facts exist which, if proven, would
require the imposition of an extended sentence, i.e., would prove
dangerousness. The notice requirement would provide a basis for
judicial review of the legality of the decision to trigger the proce-
dure. This might be termed the judicial review function of notice. 7
43. Dissenting views of Reps. Conyers, Mikva and Ryan concerning S. 30, in H.R. Rep.
No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 81, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4087.
44. See text accompanying notes 25-30 supra. While the argument might be made that
the amended notice's repeated reference to defendant's alleged associations with "organized
crime" were not specific enough to provide an adequate basis for preparing a defense, the fact
that each allegation was linked to a specifically identified piece of testimonial or documentary
evidence, which presumably defendant could have access to before the hearing, made the
amended notice sufficient for this purpose. General allegations that defendant was linked to
organized crime might fail this test.
45. 384 F. Supp. at 865, quoting S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 162 (1969).
46. A minimal notice requirement would be one way to effect an abuse of discretion
limitation. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
47. This is analogous to the function of the indictment "to inform the court of the facts
alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if
one should be had." Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 768 (1962). It may also be
analogized to the use of an indictment by a court to identify the factual basis for a grand
jury's decision to indict. Id. at 770-71. The judicial review function requires that the indict-
ment provide sufficient information to determine whether the Government's case rests upon
a legally valid definition of the crime. Minimally, the indictment must include the essential
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In reviewing the sufficiency of notice, the court would focus on the
reasonableness of the prosecutor's belief and the legal sufficiency of
the facts, if proven, to require an extended term.
That Duardi implicitly adopted this very burdensome interpreta-
tion of the notice requirement is evident from its holding that the
Government's evidence would not "validly support" a finding that
defendant was a dangerous special offender. The grounds for this
holding were a mixture of statutory construction and constitutional
interpretation."' While the court does not dismiss the Government's
notice explicitly because its allegations fail to specify all the ele-
ments of "dangerous special offender," (i.e., the court does not iden-
tify what elements must be shown to prove "dangerousness"), its
analysis is indistinguishable from that theory, at least insofar as the
burden which the notice must carry. If the notice must state "rea-
sons" which Congress "intended to be judicially considered as a
relevant sentencing factor"49 and which comport with constitutional
limitations on sentencing discretion, presumably the "reasons"
must also be such as would, if proven, justify extended sentencing
as a dangerous special offender.5 Failure of the notice to state such
reasons is grounds for dismissal under this theory, just as a civil
complaint's failure to state a cause of action is grounds for a sum-
mary judgment. That Congress intended this result in formulating
the notice provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3575, and its corollary 21 U.S.C.
§ 849, is a highly debatable proposition."'
elements of the offense. However, it may not be sufficient to frame the indictment wholly in
the language of the statutory definition of the offense, where courts have construed statutes
to encompass elements not explicitly appearing in the statutory language, e.g., knowledge.
United States v. Carli, 105 U.S. 611 (1881). Whether the judicial review function may require
a degree of factual specificity greater than that demanded by the apprisal function is an
unresolved issue. See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962); Note, Indictment Suffi-
ciency, supra note 41. See also Scott, Fairness in Accusation of Crime, 41 MINN. L. REv. 509
(1957).
48. See note 9 supra.
49. 384 F. Supp. at 880.
50. "It is therefore apparent that the government's proposed amended notice does not
state with the required particularity proper reasons which may be said to establish a factual
base for either a government attorney's belief or for an ultimate judicial factual finding that
any of the defendants may properly be considered to be dangerous special offenders, within
the meaning of §§ 3575(e)(3) and 3575(f)." Id. at 883.
51. The court may have misconstrued the fragment quoted from the Senate Report to
support its rationale. See note 45 supra and accompanying text. In conjunction with the
assertion that reasonable belief that defendant is a dangerous special offender is a prerequis-
ite to initiating the procedure, the Report cited Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court
of Ramsey County, 309 U.S. 270 (1940). That case upheld a civil procedure for involuntary
institutionalization of a person with a "psychopathic personality" which rendered him "dan-
gerous to other persons." Passing reference was made to the fact that the statute required a
petition be filed with the court after the county attorney had satisfied himself that "good
19771
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Rationales for Notice Under S. 1
The foregoing review of the law developing around this procedural
aspect of extended sentencing suggests the application of three ra-
tionales to determine the content and particularity of the Govern-
ment's notice. Whether the Senate Subcommittee which drafted S.
1 incorporates all of these approaches into proposed rule 32.1 is an
open question despite the Subcommittee's recognition of only "one
significant change in existing law" not pertinent to this issue."
Proposed rule 32.1 contains no substantive changes in its struc-
ture or language indicating that notice is not intended to serve the
minimal function of facilitating intelligent guilty pleas. Nor does
the Subcommittee's Report indicate such a legislative intent. No-
tice must, as under current law, be filed "a reasonable time before
trial or before acceptance by the court of a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere" and "shall be subject to inspection by the defendant.'"1'
Presumably the reasonable time and inspection requirements allow
the defendant to weigh intelligently the consequences of a guilty
plea. A curious omission from proposed rule 32.1, however, may
suggest a legislative intent to alter the Kelly theory by limiting the
application of the intelligent-guilty-plea rationale. Kelly disal-
lowed, as inconsistent with this rationale, post-plea curative
amendment of defective notice." The statute seems to require this
result when it states that the prosecutor, before trial or plea, "may
sign and file with the court, and may amend, a notice."55 The legis-
lative intent to subject the power of amendment to the same tem-
poral requirements as the filing of notice seems clear. However, S.
l's proposed rule makes no reference to amendment, which raises a
question of whether the drafters intend, by implication, to permit
post-plea amendment. If so, then the notice's content is irrelevant
to the intelligence of a plea entered in reliance on it. The only
important consideration for plea purposes would be the fact of fil-
ing.
On the other hand, if content is irrelevant, rule 32.1's insistence
that defendant be able to inspect the notice "during the pendency
cause" existed for initiating the procedure. On the basis of the petition, the court held a
hearing and ordered a psychiatric exam of the patient. Findings followed from the hearing
and exam. There was no indication that the probate court had jurisdiction to review the legal
sufficiency of the "good cause" finding of the county attorney. Moreover, the Supreme Court
focused primarily on the other procedural protections present.
52. REPOlr, supra note 1, at 1125. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
53. The language of proposed rule 32.1(a) is identical in this respect to 18 U.S.C. § 3575(a)
(1970) and 21 U.S.C. § 849(a) (1970).
54. See notes 34 and 35 supra.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(a) (1970); 21 U.S.C. § 849(a) (1970).
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of the criminal matter" is curious. Inspection is important if content
is; and if content is unimportant before entering a guilty plea,
inspection accomplishes little at that point. Moreover, the history
of the rule's development does not support an interpretation that
omitting reference to amendment constitutes a rejection of Kelly.
An earlier draft, with the same omission, was introduced into Con-
gress by essentially the same draftsmen over a year before Kelly was
decided.56 On the basis of these considerations, the mere silence of
S. 1 is a weak argument for inferring a legislative intent to permit
unrestricted post-plea amendment of notice.
While it is reasonable to conclude that S. 1 is not intended to alter
current notice requirements insofar as they depend on the
intelligent-guilty-plea rationale, the same cannot be said concern-
ing the other purposes served by notice in the extended sentencing
context. S. 1 contains major structural revisions of current law
which considerably lighten the Government's burden stemming
from the apprisal and judicial review functions of notice, despite the
Subcommittee's professed non-recognition of the alteration.
While proposed rule 32.1's description of the notice's content is
nearly identical to that of current law, 7 the Code's radical change
in the definition of dangerous special offender reduces what the
Government must allege. Current law provides separate and dis-
tinct definitions for the concepts "dangerous" and "special of-
fender." A defendant is a special offender if he falls within one of
the statutory definitions for recidivists, professional criminals, or
organized crime conspirators.58 He is dangerous if an extended term
is required to protect the public."9 Notice allegations must run to
both elements. In contrast, section 2302 of S. 1 collapses these sepa-
rate elements into a unitary concept. Under S. 1, a "dangerous
special offender" is one who merely meets the current definition of
"special offender." ' " The Subcommittee has, through a process of
labeling, determined that recidivists, professional criminals, and
organized crime conspirators are dangerous per se. Consequently,
under a literal reading of proposed rule 32.1, notice allegations need
not run to the element of dangerousness-the fatal defect in Kelly
56. Senators McClellan, Ervin and Hruska introduced into Congress an earlier version of
S.1 on Jan. 4, 1973. It contained proposed rule 32.2 pertaining to extended term sentencing.
The earlier version is very similar to the present proposed rule 32.1. See Hearings, supra note
2, pt. V, at 4466.
57. See note 16 supra.
58. See note 9 supra.
59. See note 20 supra.
60. See note 4 supra.
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and Duardi. The issue, of course, is whether the Subcommittee
intends this result.
An argument that it does not arises from an interesting occur-
rence in the development of S. 1. The Subcommittee does not ex-
plain its decision to sever the procedural requirements of extended
term sentencing from its substantive statutory base through a pro-
posed rule of federal criminal procedure. It makes sense, however,
to treat the procedural aspects in the rules.6 This decision was made
in an earlier draft of S. 1.12 At that time neither the procedural nor
the substantive aspects were materially altered, so that dangerous-
ness and special offender status were still separately defined and
both had to be alleged." It was after this initial severance that the
substantive revisions referred to above took place, which had the
effect of changing the notice requirements although the language of
proposed rule 32.1 remained unaltered. It is possible that the re-
duced notice requirements are simply a result of careless draftsman-
ship.
This possibility becomes slightly more plausible when it is recog-
nized that the substantive revisions do not necessarily lessen the
burden of proof that must be carried by the Government at the
hearing in order to sustain the legality of an extended term. While
the Subcommittee has, by a labeling process, made special offend-
ers per se "dangerous," S. 1 does not authorize the imposition of an
extended term solely on the finding that defendant is a DSO. As
indicated earlier, the bill also requires the court to find that "such
an extended term is warranted to protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant." 4 S. 1 retains the functional equivalent of
the dangerousness element in current law, i.e., the district court
must find defendant to be so threatening as to warrant DSO sent-
encing. Consequently, since the changes in S. 1 may be purely se-
mantic, the possibility is enhanced that apparent changes in the
notice requirements wrought by proposed rule 32.1 are wholly unin-
tended. The Subcommittee's real intent may be that notice allega-
tions still run to two distinct elements: that defendant is a DSO and
that "an extended term is warranted to protect the public."
61. This decision was criticized in testimony before the Subcommittee by John K. Van
de Kamp and Laurie Susan Harris of the Los Angeles Federal Public Defender's Office.
Hearings, supra note 2, pt. XI, at 7807, 7818.
62. S. 1, 93d. Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 2, pt. V, at 4211,
contained proposed rule 32.2 whose language is substantially identical to proposed rule 32.1.
63. Proposed rule 32.1 in section 1-4B2(b), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 2, pt. V, at
4251-52.
64. S. 1, § 2302(b).
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This conclusion is further supported when the apprisal rationale
for notice is considered. Proposed rule 32.1(b) clearly demonstrates
the Subcommittee's intent to preserve the adversary nature of
extended term hearings." The parties are entitled to assistance of
counsel, compulsory process, and cross-examination of appearing
witnesses. The court bases recorded findings of fact on these pro-
ceedings. Findings as to whether defendant is a DSO and whether
an extended term is warranted to protect the public must be sup-
ported by a preponderance of the information. Moreover, in spite of
the proposed rule's omission of the current requirement that the
court give 10 days notice of the hearing, the Subcommittee "expects
that adequate notice of, and adequate time to prepare for the hear-
ing will be afforded.""6 Finally, the proposed rule assures that the
Government's notice shall be subject to inspection by the defen-
dant. If the notice is to apprise the defendant of the basis for invok-
ing the extended term procedure so that counsel can adequately
prepare a defense for the hearing, it is difficult to see how the ap-
prisal function can be served if the notice allegations do not run
to both factual predicates of a DSO sentence.
Three countervailing considerations, however, argue against the
conclusion that the Subcommittee intends to require the notice to
allege facts showing defendant's menace sufficient to warrant a
DSO term. First, this allegation is not required to apprise the defen-
dant of the case against him, because much of the information, upon
which the court must make its finding that defendant is a public
menace, may be unavailable to the Government when it files notice.
Section 2302(b) of S. 1 requires the court to base its public safety
finding on "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant," a focus absent from
current law. The proposed rule directs that this information be ad-
duced from the evidence offered at the trial and the sentencing
hearing and from the pre-sentence report. The latter probably con-
tains the information most pertinent to the sentencing deci-
sion-that bearing on the defendant's history and characteristics.1
7
Since this information is not developed until after conviction, it
would be impossible for the Government to make pre-trial allega-
tions based on this data. The silence of the notice in this regard does
65. See note 11 supra.
66. REPORT, supra note 1, at 1126.
67. The purpose of the presentencing report in the proposed Code is "to provide a court
with the resources necessary for the acquisition of a large base of information on a convicted
offender, including his past history, his present condition, and his future prognosis, in order
to insure a sound basis in fact for its sentencing decision." REPORT, supra note 1, at 896.
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not necessarily weaken defendant's ability to prepare an adequate
defense for the hearing.
The Apprisal Function and the Scope of Notice Under S. 1
The apprisal function is served by pre-hearing disclosure of the
pre-sentence report. Proposed rule 32(c)(3)(A) provides for disclo-
sure, upon defendant's request, of those portions of the report the
disclosure of which might be harmful to defendant or others, exclud-
ing sentence recommendations, diagnostic opinion, and information
sources protected by a promise of confidentialitya" The Subcommit-
tee clearly intends that the disclosure provisions of proposed rule 32
pertain to both conventional and extended term sentencing. 9
Whether the limitations on disclosure, itemized in proposed rule 32,
so weaken the apprisal function of disclosure as to make it less than
adequate is an open question. 0 However, it is evident that even a
limited disclosure of the pre-sentence report would better serve the
apprisal function than a notice filed before the pre-sentence investi-
gation is conducted.
Second, the argument that S. 1 makes purely cosmetic changes
in the substantive findings required to authorize an extended term
may be overstated. Section 2302(b) does more than merely attach
the label of dangerousness to special offenders. Additionally, it re-
casts the definition of the public menace which the court must find.
Current law authorizes an extended term if it is "required" for pub-
lic protection, while section 2302(b) authorizes it if "warranted" for
public safety. Also, current law authorizes an extended term if "a
period of confinement longer than that provided" by conventional
sentencing statutes is required. 7' This suggests that the authorized
68. S. 1, § 378.
69. "It is not necessary for subdivision (b) of [proposed rule 32.1] to carry over the
provisions of 18 U.S.C. 3575(b) regarding inspecting of the presentence report and related
matter. Comparable provisions appear in Rule 32(c)(3) of these rules." Report, supra note 1,
at 1126.
70. See Symposium, Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Federal Court: Due Process
and Judicial Discretion, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 1527 (1975). It is worth noting that while proposed
rule 32(c)(3)(a) represents a more liberal approach to disclosure than current rule 32, in the
context of extended term sentencing, it may result in less disclosure than section 3575(b) and
section 849(b). Current law provides for inspection sufficiently in advance of the hearings to
afford a reasonable opportunity for verification; limits non-disclosure to extraordinary cases
and, even in such cases, leaves disclosure as a matter of judicial discretion; requires a with-
holding judge to record reasons for non-disclosure; and requires the inspecting parties to give
notice of intent to controvert the contents of the presentence report. Proposed rule 32 leaves
the timing of disclosure up to the court; expands the described instances of non-disclosure
and appears to make it mandatory upon the court; merely requires the withholding judge to
summarize the information relied on in determining sentence; and imposes no requirement
of notice of intent to controvert.
71. See note 20 supra.
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maximum conventional sentence for the felony, of which defendant
is convicted, is a fixed baseline against which defendant's danger to
society is measured. Section 2302(b) merely authorizes "an ex-
tended term," if warranted and section 2301(c) defines an extended
term as "not more than twice the term authorized for the felony"
under the conventional sentencing provisions." Hence, the author-
ized maximum conventional sentence is not necessarily the baseline
against which defendant's dangerousness is measured.73
Both of these alterations move the critical element in extended
term sentencing-defendant's threat to public safety 74-away from
the mechanical approach of current law and toward the more discre-
tionary model of judicial sentencing. As discretion to find that an
individual defendant is a threat to public safety increases, contin-
gent upon proof that defendant is a recidivist, professional criminal,
or organized crime conspirator, the burden on the Government to
plead and prove the public menace element may lessen.75 While
expanded judicial discretion to find dangerousness may create con-
stitutional difficulties, 6 the Subcommittee appears willing to risk it
in order to lighten the burden imposed on the Government by Kelly
and Duardi.
Third, the argument that inadvertent draftsmanship explains the
72. S. 1, §§ 2302(b), 2301(c).
73. See text accompanying notes 86 through 89 infra.
74. The Subcommittee confines the rationale for extended term sentencing to protection
of the public and further states that "the sentencing goals of just punishment, deterence,
and rehabilitation will not support the imposition of an extended term." REPORT, supra note
1, at 922 n.16.
75. The Supreme Court recently held as violative of due process a Maine rule requiring a
defendant, charged with homicide, to prove that he acted "in the heat of passion on sudden
provocation" to reduce the offense from murder to manslaughter. The result was reached over
the argument that due process requirements that the state prove every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt did not control here because (1) in Maine, murder and manslaugh-
ter were merely "punishment categories" for the offense of felonious homicide, and (2) under
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), a court's sentencing discretion was not burdened
with "rigorous due process demands." Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 694-97 (1975). The
Court distinguished Williams and seems to have limited it to the "traditional discretion" of
the trial judge "to impose a sentence within the statutorily defined limits" attached to a
particular offense. Id. at 697 n.23. The Court's distinction may have rested on the difference
between the application of legislatively defined standards to a set of facts to determine if the
legislative criteria have been met and the imposition of a sentence, in the absence of meaning-
ful legislative criteria, individualized to meet the characteristics of a unique offender. See
Increased Sentences, supra note 13, at 371-72. This analysis applied in the extended sentenc-
ing context supports relaxed due process requirements concerning notice of evidence of dan-
gerousness where the statutory criteria for determining an individual's danger to society are
so vague as to commit the issue largely to the discretion of the sentencing judge. The same
argument does not apply to notice of facts pertaining to DSO status where elaborate statutory
definitions channel the judicial process.
76. See id. at 369-72.
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apparent relaxation of notice requirements is further weakened by
the fact that when the Senate drafters reworked an earlier version
of S. 1, containing a forerunner of proposed rule 32.1, they made
several cosmetic changes in the rule. It is difficult to believe that
they inadvertently overlooked the effect of the rule's language77 in
light of major revisions in the substantive sections upon which the
rule depends.
A final issue remains-whether S. 1 imposes those requirements
on the Government which Duardi derived from the judicial review
function of notice. If the Subcommittee does not intend that notice
serve the apprisal function with respect to defendant's menacing
characteristics it is unlikely that it intends to burden the Govern-
ment with Duardi. S. 1 appears to reverse that holding. It is unclear
from the legislative history, however, whether that aspect of notice
running to the element of DSO status is also immune from scrutiny
by the court on a motion to dismiss on grounds of legal insufficiency.
The differences outlined above7 s between the elements of DSO sta-
tus and defendant's actual threat together with the apparently dif-
ferent roles ascribed to the court in determining these issues, may
justify stricter notice requirements with respect to DSO status.79 As
to whether defendant is a recidivist, a professional criminal, or an
organized crime conspirator, the Government may still be required
to justify its decision to trigger the procedure. This would not be
inconsistent with any aspect of the legislative history of S. 1 appar-
ent at this time.
JUDICIAL CRITERIA FOR MEASURING DEFENDANT'S DANGEROUSNESS
The Code leaves unspecified the factual predicates which must
support a finding that defendant is so menacing as to warrant sent-
encing as a DSO. However, the district court's discretion to make
the determination is not unlimited. Findings on the issue are re-
viewable on appeal under the standard of clear error.'" The question
remains: What limits does Congress intend to impose upon this
discretion?
Dangerousness Under Section 2302
These limits are not easily discerned from the statutory language
of S. 1. Section 2302(b) directs the district court to determine
77. See note 62 supra.
78. See text accompanying notes 58-63 supra.
79. Due process may compel stricter notice requirements concerning DSO status. See note
75 supra.
80. . 1, § 3725(c)(2).
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whether, "considering the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the defendant, such an ex-
tended term is warranted to protect the public from further crimes
of the defendant." The focus is on defendant's potential for future
criminal conduct as inferred from past and present behavior. More
than a mere probability of future crime is required. The probability
and seriousness must be sufficient to "warrant" an extended term
If this is more than a tautology, i.e., a court grounds its decision to
impose a DSO term on its "finding" that such sentencing is "war-
ranted," it suggests that the legal sufficiency of a DSO's threat
should be measured by comparing the offender's menacing charac-
teristics with those of some control group. Only if a DSO presents a
more significant threat is sentencing as a DSO warranted. The ques-
tion remains: What are the parameters of the control group against
which a particular DSO is compared? An incomplete answer is some
group of offenders who have previously been treated under the
court's conventional sentencing authority. If menacing characteris-
tics distinguish a DSO from this group, the court's conventional
authority may be inadequate to protect public safety.
Although not clearly mandated by S. 1, this comparative ap-
proach is wholly consistent with the statutory language. Current law
suggests more clearly, however, that courts should use this metho-
dology to measure a special offender's dangerousness. 18 U.S.C. §
3575(f) specifies that an offender is dangerous when "a period of
confinement longer than [the maximum conventional term] pro-
vided for such felony is required for the protection of the public from
further criminal conduct by the defendant."'" The underlying issue
is whether the court's authority to impose the maximum conven-
tional term is adequate to protect the public. A reasonable way to
resolve that issue is to compare the defendant's dangerousness with
the dangerousness of offenders sentenced to the maximum term for
committing similar offenses.82
There is other language in 18 U.S.C. § 3575, however, indicating
that this may not be the intended construction. Subsection (d)
states: "This section shall not be construed as creating any manda-
tory minimum penalty." 3 Yet the approach described above-the
"maximum term" test for dangerousness-implicitly carries a man-
datory minimum term for dangerous special offenders equal to the
conventional maximum for the offense involved. As the Justice De-
81. 21 U.S.C. § 849(f) (1970) contains nearly identical language.
82. United States v. Duardi, 384 F. Supp. 871, 873 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
83. 21 U.S.C. § 849(d) (1970) contains identical language.
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partment argued to the House Judiciary Committee, which acted
upon section 3575, "[i]f a court finds that the usual maximum
term for the felony, or any lesser term, is all that should be imposed,
by definition the court could not find the defendant to be a danger-
ous special offender."'"
If subsection (d) is taken literally, the logic of the "maximum
term" test falls and the language of subsection (f) must be construed
in some obscure manner. A compromise between the two provisions
is possible if both are construed loosely. Subsection (f) may refer to
some lesser standard than the maximum conventional term as a
baseline for measuring dangerousness, 5 e.g., how does defendant
compare to the control group delineated by those receiving sent-
ences near the mean term for the felony in question? This approach
would not conflict with subsection (d)'s repudiation of mandatory
minimums if read more narrowly. Subsection (d) is then merely an
effort to authorize sentences for dangerous special offenders less
than the statutory conventional maximum. No reported decision
has engaged in the legal gymnastics which this harmonization of
congressional purposes demands.
The vagaries of S. 1 sidestep these dilemmas. Mandatory mini-
mums for DSOs are neither blessed nor cursed. Consequently, the
''maximum term" test for dangerousness does not have to overcome
the logical obstacles of current law. On the other hand, the public
safety interest is more loosely formulated so that the "maximum
term" test is not mandated. In other words, while S. 1 seems to
recognize that some mandatory minimum term is the logical corol-
lary of any test for dangerousness that compares a particular DSO
with some control group, the minimum consisting of whatever
sentencing level delineates the group, Congress permits the courts
to decide what test to apply.
Judicial Delimiting of Section 2302
A close reading of the sentencing provisions confirms the unre-
solved nature of the issue. If the court finds defendant to be a DSO
who warrants sentencing as such, it "shall impose an extended term
84. H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 89, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4066.
85. To reach this result the word provided in subsection (f)'s phrase, "A defendant is
dangerous . . . if a period of confinement longer than that provided for such felony is re-
quired," must be construed more broadly than meaning "the maximum authorized by stat-
ute." Interestingly, when this narrow, technical meaning was clearly intended in subsection
(b), Congress expressed itself more explicitly by stating "the maximum term otherwise au-
thorized by law for such felony."
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of imprisonment, within the range authorized by section 2301(c)." ' 1
However, the range, as described in that section, has no lower limit,
only an upper limit. If the Subcommittee clearly intended the
"maximum term" test, ambiguity could have been easily avoided
by providing a lower limit for extended terms equal to the maximum
conventional term. 7
At least two alternatives to the "maximum term" test are avail-
able under S. 1. One might be labeled the "mandatory imprison-
ment" test. The control group for comparison consists of felons com-
mitting the same offense, who had been sentenced to probation
and/or fines rather than imprisonment. A significant difference be-
tween the threat potential of a DSO and the members of this group
would be the basis for concluding that some incapacitation was
warranted to protect the public, that the court's conventional sent-
encing authority to grant probation was inconsistent with this pur-
pose, and that authority to imprison defendant as a DSO was war-
ranted.m
A second alternative might be labeled the "reasonable term" test.
Here, the control group consists of those non-DSO felons, with of-
fenses and personal characteristics similar to defendant's, excluding
those aspects of defendant's conduct comprising the factual predi-
cates of DSO status. If the DSO facts, in conjunction with defen-
dant's other characteristics, indicate a threat significantly greater
than that of the control group, sentencing as a DSO is warranted.
Absent those facts, the court's conventional authority is limited by
86. S. 1, § 2302(b).
87. In elaborating upon S. l's definition of "extended term," the Report in a footnote
states: "In a case involving the commission of a Class D felony, for example, a defendant,
who is not found by the court to be a dangerous special offender can be sentenced to imprison-
ment for any period from zero to seven years, while a defendant who is found to be a dangerous
special offender can be sentenced to imprisonment for eight, nine, ten, or any greater number
of years-up to a maximum of fourteen-that the court finds to be warranted." REPORT, supra
note 1, at 919 n.l (emphasis added). If this comment is read to imply that a Class D felon-
DSO cannot be sentenced for less than 7 years, then a legislative preference for the "maxi-
mum term" approach seems to emerge. But the comment can just as easily be taken as a
simple illustration of how the district court's sentencing authority is enhanced by correct
DSO findings.
88. There is some evidence in the legislative history of section 3575 that the Justice
Department understood the mandatory minimum implicit in that provision to be some prison
term. Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson, in a letter to the Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee stated: "Furthermore, inasmuch as an offender in any of the three
defined categories is to be considered 'dangerous' only when the court finds that a longer
prison term than that which may be imposed for the felony of which he has been convicted
is required to protect the public from further criminal conduct on his part, it would be
incongruous for the court to fail to sentence a 'dangerous' offender to any prison term at all."
H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 89, reprinted in 11970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4065.
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the policy of sentencing "reasonableness" applied by appellate
courts reviewing sentences under new Code provisions aimed at re-
forming and rationalizing federal sentencing practices."5 Given de-
fendant's distinctive threat arising from conduct associated with
DSO status, the authority to sentence to a reasonable term within
conventional statutory limits may be inadequate, thereby warrant-
ing enhancement of judicial authority to impose a DSO term.
As of this writing, the choice among these three tests-maximum
term, mandatory imprisonment, and reasonable term-appears to
be a matter left for judicial policy-making. The consequences of
each test for the operation of S. l's provisions for dangerous offend-
ers and its attempt to rationalize sentencing through appellate re-
view are very different. Any assessment of these tests should begin
with an understanding of their consequences. The remainder of this
article focuses on these impacts.
One consequence involves the number of DSOs who would be
subjected to enhanced sentencing authority. Fewer DSOs would be
sentenced as such under the "maximum term" test than under
either other alternative. Very few conventional offenders receive the
maximum term. A DSO's conduct, apart from that mere legal sta-
tus, would have to be menacing in the extreme to set the offender
apart from the control group. Under the "reasonable term" test,
however, defendant's public threat could be considerably less and
still justify DSO sentencing. Apart from the DSO facts, the defen-
dant's characteristics might suggest a control group posing a rela-
tively minor threat. Giving the DSO facts their proper weight, the
court would not be required to perceive dangerousness comparable
to that posed by conventional offenders, receiving the maximum
term, in order to justify DSO sentencing. The "mandatory impris-
onment" test would expose the largest number of DSOs to enhanced
sentencing authority. The circumstances would be rare when the
threat posed by a DSO would be perceived as less than the danger-
ousness of conventional felons given probation or simple fines.
A second consequence concerns the harshness of the terms result-
ing from DSO sentencing. The "maximum term" test is the most
punitive because its logic requires imposition of a sentence longer
than the conventional maximum authorized for the felony. The dis-
trict court has greater leeway under the "reasonable term" test. The
norm for non-DSOs similar to defendant would probably be sub-
stantially below the conventional maximum. Therefore, mandatory
89. S. 1, § 3725. See text accompanying notes 96-101 infra for a discussion of these
provisions.
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minimum sentences would be generally shorter. The "mandatory
imprisonment" test provides the broadest discretion to impose the
most lenient sentences on DSOs, eliminating only probation and
simple fines as sentencing alternatives.
Appellate Review and the Impact of Judicial Scrutiny
Several consequences affect S. l's novel provisions for appellate
review of sentencing decisions. In order to understand these conse-
quences, it is necessary to summarize the review sections.
Prison sentences for felonies may be reviewed by federal circuit
courts upon the defendant's petition if the sentence exceeds one-
fifth of the statutory conventional maximum, or upon the Govern-
ment's petition, if the sentence is less than three-fifths of the con-
ventional maximum. 0 In deciding whether to affirm or modify the
sentence, or remand for further proceedings, the appellate court
must make several determinations.' First, it must decide if the
90. S. 1, § 3725(a).
91. S. 1, § 3725 provides in pertinent part:
(c) Considerations. -Upon review of the record, the court of appeals shall deter-
mine whether:
(1) the sentence imposed is clearly unreasonable, having regard for:
(A) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant;
(B) the purposes of sentencing required to be considered by part
III of this title;
(C) the opportunity of the district court to observe the defendant;
and
(D) the findings under section 2302(b) if the defendant was sent-
enced as a dangerous special offender; and
(2) the findings under section 2302(b), if the defendant was sentenced as a
dangerous special offender, were clearly erroneous.
(d) Decision and Disposition.-If the court of appeals:
(1) determines that:
(A) the sentence is not clearly unreasonable; and
(B) the findings under section 2302(b), if the defendant was sent-
enced as a dangerous special offender, were not clearly erroneous,
or were clearly erroneous but the sentence was not affected, it shall
affirm the sentence;
(2) determines that the sentence is clearly unreasonable and that the sent-
ence is:
(A) excessive, it shall set aside the sentence and:
(i) impose a lesser sentence;
(ii) remand the case for imposition of a lesser sentence; or
(iii) remand the case for further sentencing proceedings;
(B) insufficient, it shall, if a petition for review by the government
had been granted by the court of appeals, set aside the sentence
and:
(i) impose a greater sentence;
(ii) remand the case for imposition of a greater sentence; or
(iii) remand the case for further sentencing proceedings; or
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sentence is "clearly unreasonable" having regard for several factors,
including the district court's findings as to DSO status and whether
an extended term is warranted. These section 2302(b) findings are
relevant to the reasonableness issue only "if the defendant was sent-
enced as" a DSO.2 Second, the court must determine if these find-
ings are "clearly erroneous," but, again, only if the defendant "was
sentenced as" a DSO.13 Third, if these findings are erroneous, the
court must further determine if the error "affected" the sentence or
if it was merely harmless errorY Fourth, if the sentence is clearly
unreasonable, the court must determine if it was "excessive" or
"insufficient."9 5
If defendant was not sentenced as a DSO, the appeal depends on
how the court resolves the reasonableness and excessiveness or in-
sufficiency issues. However, if an extended term was imposed, the
matter is more complex. If the district court's 2302(b) findings are
clearly erroneous and affect the sentence, the case must be re-
manded for further sentencing proceedings." On the other hand, if
the DSO findings are correct or only infected with harmless error,
S. 1 is ambiguous as to the result. Section 3725(d)(1) requires af-
firmance if the sentence is not clearly unreasonable and if the DSO
findings are not harmfully erroneous. When "and" is read conjunc-
tively, i.e., affirmance required only when both conditions are met,
the circuit court is not precluded from modifying or remanding a
DSO sentence, on grounds that it is unreasonable, merely because
the DSO findings are free from harmful error. Holding that the
sentence is unreasonable moves the court on to the excessiveness or
insufficiency issue. If "and" may be read disjunctively in its con-
text, i.e., affirmance required when either the sentence is not unrea-
sonable or the section 2302(b) findings are not harmfully erroneous,
the scope of review of DSO terms is drastically curtailed. Whether
the defendant appeals because of excessive severity or the Govern-
ment because of insufficiency, the appellate court is precluded from
resolving these issues when DSO findings are substantially correct.
Unless an especially punitive congressional purpose is read into
the extended sentencing provisions, the principle of leniency, which
(3) determines that a finding under section 2302(b), if the defendant was
sentenced as a dangerous special offender, was clearly erroneous and the
sentence was affected by such finding, it shall set aside the sentence and
remand the case for further sentencing proceedings.
92. S. 1, § 3725(c)(1)(D) (emphasis added). See note 91 supra.
93. S. 1, § 3 7 2 5(c)(2). See note 91 supra.
94. S. 1, § 3725(d)(1)(B) and § 3725(d)(3). See note 91 supra.
95. S. 1, §§ 3725(d)(2)(A)-(B). See note 91 supra.
96. S. 1, § 3725(d)(3).
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the drafters of S. 1 expressly recognize as left intact by the Code,97
calls for the conjunctive construction, as the one less severe on de-
fendants. However, the Subcommittee Report contains language
suggesting a legislative preference for the harsher construction:
"[I]f the court of appeals finds that the sentence imposed is not
clearly unreasonable, it is to affirm the sentence. It is also to affirm
the sentence if there were findings under section 2302(b) and such
findings were not clearly erroneous or, if erroneous, the sentence was
not affected thereby. . . . Section 3725 calls for the sentence to be
affirmed even if the finding as to a dangerous special offender was
erroneous if the error did not affect the finding. The Committee
intends that the well established and traditional harmless error rule
of current law be applied in such a situation.""8 The comment treats
non-error, or harmless error, as a separate and mandatory ground
for affirmance.
Yet, if the disjunctive construction is required, section
3725(c)(2)'s rule that the appellate court consider DSO findings in
resolving the reasonableness issue makes little sense. The only in-
stance where this rule applies is when the DSO findings are cor-
rect.9 Under the disjunctive interpretation, correct findings require
affirmance. Then why make the court determine the reasonableness
of DSO sentences at all? Furthermore, if in light of correct DSO
findings the sentence is unreasonable, the disjunctive approach puts
the court in the paradoxical position of affirming a sentence it has
found unreasonable. Finally, this interpretation forces the court to
violate section 3725(d)(2) which mandates sentence modification or
remand upon a finding of unreasonableness.
The drafters of S. 1 provided for appellate review of sentences,
guided by the reasonableness standard, in order "to eliminate un-
warranted disparities in federal sentences" and to promote "the
development of a body of principles which will better rationalize the
sentencing process."'10 Their report contains no hint of an intent to
place DSO sentencing beyond the objectives of uniformity and ra-
tionality. But the disjunctive construction makes application of the
97. REPORT, supra note 1, at 24.
98. Id. at 1052.
99. If the findings are harmfully erroneous, the court must remand for further proceed-
ings. S. 1, § 3725(d)(3).
100. REPORT, supra note 1, at 1050-51. Considerable attention was focused on this problem
during the hearings before the Subcommittee. E.g., Hearings, supra note 2, pt. VI, at 5514
(testimony of Daniel J. Meador); id. at 5649 (testimony of Marvin E. Frankel); id. at 7689
(testimony of Raymond L. Falls, Jr.). The problem of non-review of sentences has been
examined in Comment, Federal Appellate Review of Sentences-United States v. McKinney,
7 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1128 (1973); Case Note, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 867 (1975).
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reasonableness standard to DSO terms practically impossible.
Therefore, comments in the report which seem to treat the correct-
ness of DSO findings as a necessary and sufficient ground for affirm-
ance should be read as an oversimplification of the statutory lan-
guage requiring a conjunctive interpretation. 10 Review, modifica-
tion, or remand of extended terms because they are clearly unrea-
sonable may occur despite substantially correct findings that defen-
dant is a DSO who warrants sentencing as such.
The foregoing summary of the appellate review provisions makes
it possible to return to the main theme of this discussion-the im-
pact of various tests for deciding when DSO sentencing is war-
ranted. Two broad types of consequences are discernible: the effect
on review for clear error in DSO findings and the impact on review
for reasonableness in the sentencing decision itself.
Toward a Standard of Review for Dangerousness
The impact on clear error review stems from the Code's limitation
that such review occur only if the defendant "was sentenced as" a
DSO.'12 Even if the district court finds that defendant is a DSO, its
decision that an extended term is not warranted, i.e., its decision
not to sentence defendant as a DSO, is non-reviewable and pre-
cludes review of findings as to DSO status. The "maximum term"
test produces the greatest quantitative shrinkage in the scope of
review because, under it, the largest proportion of DSOs escape
extended term sentencing. The Government will frequently find
itself in the frustrating position of having proven defendant to be a
DSO while being unable to obtain review of the district judge's
refusal to sentence as a DSO. Moreover, if the Government seeks
review on grounds of unreasonable leniency, the fact that defendant
is a DSO is irrelevant to the reasonableness determination, again
because the Code limits consideration of that fact to cases where
DSO sentencing actually occurs. 0 3 The "maximum term" test is not
burdensome to defendants in the same sense because only those
receiving extended terms would be likely to seek review of DSO
findings.
At the other extreme, the "mandatory imprisonment" test max-
imizes clear error review of district court discretion to impose ex-
tended terms, since practically all DSOs would be sentenced as
101. At least part of the comment cited in the text accompanying note 98 supra merely
states the legislative intent that the established rule of harmless error be the standard for
determining when erroneous DSO findings must be remanded.
102. S. 1, § 3725(c)(2).
103. S. 1, § 3725(c)(1)(D).
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such. While such review has little significance for defining the limits
of district court discretion to decide when extended terms are war-
ranted (because few reversals would occur on the issue before the
appeals court-whether it was clear error to sentence a DSO to some
prison term rather than probation and a simple fine), this type of
review has greater importance for shaping the law developing
around the elements of DSO status. Moreover, the disparity be-
tween the defendant's and the Government's ability to invoke re-
view of DSO determinations is diminished.
The "reasonable term" test falls in between these extremes. Since
the proportion of DSOs sentenced as such is higher than under the
"maximum term" test, the frequency of the Government's inability
to obtain review of refusals to impose a DSO sentence decreases, but
is still greater than under the "mandatory imprisonment" test.
Moreover, instances of non-review would largely consist of offenders
whose menacing characteristics are not especially more aggravated
than non-DSOs committing similar crimes, in contrast to the pat-
tern under the "maximum term" test where many DSOs, not being
sentenced as such, would tend to be more threatening than the
norm.
The other type of consequence for sentence appeals involves the
impact on review for reasonableness. Two effects are discernible.
One arises from the requirement that erroneous DSO findings be
harmful in order to be grounds for a remand. If the district court
makes an erroneous finding of fact upon which may rest an ultimate
finding that defendant warrants DSO treatment, the error is harm-
less if it did not substantially affect the ultimate finding.'"4 If the
error contributes to the ultimate finding or influences the court's
decision that extended sentencing is warranted, the error is harmful.
Interestingly, S. l's focus is not limited to error which affects an
ultimate finding that DSO sentencing is warranted, although the
Subcommittee intends to include this type of error as grounds for a
remand.'"5 The Code's language is broader, condemning error which
affects a sentence.06
If the district court erroneously concludes that defendant should
be sentenced as a DSO, and in reaching that result applies the
"maximum term" test, it is impossible for the error to be harmless
in the sense that "the sentence was not affected." The error auto-
matically escalates the sentence into the range above the conven-
104. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946); cf. proposed rule 52(a), S. 1, at 392.
105. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
106. S. 1, §§ 3725(d)(1)(B) and 3725(d)(3).
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tional maximum. The only errors amenable to harmless error analy-
sis are incorrect findings of fact which do not substantially affect
ultimate DSO findings. Erroneous ultimate findings that DSO sent-
encing is warranted are per se harmful when based on this test.
On the other hand, such erroneous findings reached as a result of
applying the "reasonable term" or "mandatory imprisonment"
tests are not per se harmful, because the findings do not necessarily
affect the sentence. If the district court sentences defendant as a
DSO but does not go beyond the conventional maximum, the sent-
ence may still be justified, on appeal, by factors other than the
erroneous DSO findings. The harmless error standard, in the broad
sense the Code seems to require, may be satisfied under these
tests. ,07
The significance of this difference for review of sentencing reason-
ableness arises from the Code's clear mandate that when a DSO
sentence is infected with harmful error, review for reasonableness is
precluded and a remand for further proceedings is required.," The
focus of any further proceedings is on correcting the error rather
than on the propriety of the sentence. This pattern would be more
frequent under the "maximum term" test, given its tendency to-
ward per se harmful error, than under either of the alternatives. If
the earlier analysis is valid regarding the congressional intent to
authorize review and sentence modification on reasonableness
grounds even in the face of correct DSO findings,0 9 an appellate
court's greater leeway under the alternative tests to disregard DSO
errors as harmless enhances the court's ability to focus on the poli-
cies which underlie DSO sentences. Hence, the alternative tests will
promote a greater likelihood that appeals will be disposed of on the
merits of the sentence rather than on the technical grounds asso-
ciated with DSO findings under section 2302(b).
The other effect upon review for reasonableness stems from the
implied mandatory minimum term which accompanies each test.
That minimum, in effect, becomes a floor below which analysis of
sentencing reasonableness cannot probe. If the finding is correct
that a DSO term is warranted as measured by the sentencing bench-
mark of each test, then an appeals court cannot require the imposi-
tion of a lesser term on grounds of sentencing reasonableness. This
holds in spite of the possibility that absent DSO findings reason-
107. It does not follow that DSO errors accompanying sentences less than the conven-
tional maximum would be per se harmless. The issue of whether the error affected the
sentence would remain open.
108. S. 1, § 3725(d)(3).
109. See text accompanying notes 98-101 supra.
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ableness would require a lesser term. Of course, the whole point of
the DSO provisions is to create a double standard of reasonable-
ness-one for conventional offenders and one for DSOs. But the
extent to which those standards overlap, or more accurately, the
range of sentencing alternatives which appeals courts should be
allowed to consider in deciding what reasonableness requires for a
particular DSO, is precisely the issue that the Code leaves open.
Perhaps the problem is best illustrated by example. Defendant is
convicted of a Class D felony under section 1731(b)(2)(B)(ii) for
stealing a car worth $350 and moving it across state lines. He was
an addict at the time of the theft. Defendant's record of previous
convictions (two minor drug related felonies during the previous 10
years, one resulting in his imprisonment for six months) establishes
his DSO status under the recidivist provision."' The district court's
finding that defendant's danger to society is such as to warrant
sentencing as a DSO is not clearly erroneous. A four year prison
term is imposed. The conventional maximum for a Class E felony
is three years"' and defendant appeals. On review, the court's in-
quiry into the reasonableness of the sentence is limited by the prin-
ciple that a three year term is per se reasonable, i.e., logically man-
dated since the "maximum term" test is the accepted rule for decid-
ing whether DSO sentencing is warranted. However, if the "some
imprisonment" test is used, review for reasonableness has a broader
scope limited only by the principle that some term of imprisonment
is per se reasonable. Moreover, factors related to the circumstances
of the offense and defendant's characteristics may argue compel-
lingly that any term longer than two years would be clearly unrea-
sonable in light of federal sentencing policy. At the same time, those
factors might not be relevant to the assessment of defendant's dan-
gerousness in comparison to some control group. Consequently,
there would not be grounds for remanding because of erroneous DSO
findings. But neither could there be grounds for sentence modifica-
tion because of unreasonable excess if the "maximum term" test is
accepted. The factors relating to the circumstances of the offense
and characteristics of the defendant would justify reduction if the
"mandatory imprisonment" test is accepted. These factors would
also justify reduction if the "reasonable term" test is used because
the mandatory minimum implicit here would probably be less than
the two year maximum arising from the above application of the
clearly unreasonable standard, taking into account all information
110. S. 1, § 2302(b)(1). See note 4 supra.
111. S. 1, § 2301(b)(5).
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about defendant's conduct including the factual predicates of his
DSO status.
The following table summarizes the foregoing comparison of the
three approaches to deciding whether a defendant's dangerousness
warrants sentencing as a DSO:
CONSEQUENCES TESTS
Maximum Term Reasonable Term Mandatory Imprisonment
1. Number of Only the Probably most Practically all
DSOs sentenced most menacing
as such
2. Length of Longest Intermediate Shortest
term imposed
3. Frequency of Seldom since Intermediate Almost always
review for clear few DSOs since most DSOs
error in DSO sentenced sentenced
findings as such as such
4. Frequency of Least often Intermediate Almost always
review for since erro- since harmfully
reasonableness neous DSO erroneous DSO
of DSO terms findings findings are rare
5. Scope of Narrow Intermediate Broad
review for
reasonableness
of DSO terms
CONCLUSION
If enacted, S. 1 will produce significant changes in current federal
law concerning enhanced sentencing for dangerous offenders. While
retaining the present requirement that the Government give pre-
trial notice of its intention to invoke special sentencing procedures
that may expose defendant to an extended term, S. 1 considerably
reduces the burden which that notice must carry. No longer will the
Government have to indicate in its notice the kind of evidence
which will be introduced to prove that defendant is so menacing as
to warrant an extended term. A practical result of eliminating this
burden will be to lessen an unwilling district court's ability to avoid
the extended term procedures by finding defects in the Govern-
ment's notice. Furthermore, Congress appears to be willing to open
a door for judicial policy-making relative to the crucial issue of how
to measure a particular defendant's dangerousness and what degree
of danger is necessary to warrant an extended term. The suggestion
of current law-that defendant's menace must exceed the threat
posed by the most menacing conventional felons committing similar
crimes-is absent from S. 1, and the door is left open for the adop-
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tion of more flexible alternatives. The discussion of these alterna-
tives and their consequences for the operation of the dangerous of-
fender provisions hopefully will contribute to the resolution of a
difficult issue left open to the federal courts if S. 1 becomes law in
substantially its present form.
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